

# {k0} - 2024/10/10 Notícias de Inteligência ! (pdf)

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## Nova rodada de cessar-fogo e negociações de reféns fracassa {k0} Doha

A nother round of ceasefire and hostage talks, this time in Doha, has ended in disappointment. This is in large part because Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, is unlikely to accept any agreement that Hamas could present as a victory – and has handcuffed the Israeli mediators with conditions that appear impossible for Hamas to accept.

## A batalha pela dignidade nacional e honra

Huge quantities of explosives have been dropped on Gaza by Israel since 7 October because of the humiliation felt by all Israelis, and especially Israel's leaders and military. So much of this war over more than 10 months has been fought on both sides as a war of revenge. Nonetheless, it also has major strategic consequences for Israel, Hamas, the Palestinian people, the nations of the region, and the world's major powers – above all the United States.

## As condições israelenses para um acordo

Hamas will view and present any agreement with Israel that ends the war in Gaza, leads to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the strip, and releases Palestinian prisoners, as a victory and Israeli surrender. Therefore Israeli negotiators will not agree to a full withdrawal, and are demanding long-term Israeli military presence along the Gaza-Egypt border, and a security mechanism that would ensure that armed Hamas and other military personnel cannot move from the south of Gaza to the north. In addition, Netanyahu is demanding a veto on the Palestinian prisoners who would be released in the deal, and that those serving life sentences would be deported outside Palestine for life. These additional conditions are unacceptable to Hamas.

## O risco de mais mortes

It is also difficult to imagine that Netanyahu will make any deal with Hamas before the killing of the main Hamas leaders in Gaza, primarily Yahya Sinwar. When the Israeli military finds Sinwar and kills him, there are likely to be Israeli hostages surrounding him and the bunker may be booby-trapped with explosives. There is likely to be a fight to the death that may result in Israeli soldiers and hostages being killed as well as the Hamas leaders and their soldiers. There is also a risk that Hamas militants will kill more hostages when their leader is killed.

## A ética israelense {k0} questão

For most of the people of Israel, there is no victory without the return of the remaining Israeli hostages in Gaza. Yet these negotiations make clear that Netanyahu has put his impossible goal of total victory before their safe return. Many of them may no longer be alive, whether killed by Hamas or Israeli bombs. There is a possibility that some of those bodies may never be found and returned. Historically, Israel's ethos has been centred on the principle that no one is left behind.

The world was stunned in 2011 when Israel released 1,027 Palestinian prisoners (of whom more than 300 were serving life terms for violent attacks) in exchange for just one Israeli soldier. At the time, about 80% of Israelis supported that deal and 26 members of Netanyahu's government voted in favour of it, with only three ministers in opposition. That ethos seems now to be broken. No one can accuse Netanyahu of not wanting to bring the hostages home, but it seems quite clear that this is not his first priority. Most Israeli pundits believe that Netanyahu's "total victory" is more about extending the war for as long as possible in order to remain in power. The prime minister is slowly rising in the polls as his base, which in good part had deserted him after the Hamas attack, begins to return.

## **O papel dos mediadores**

The chances of successful Israeli-Hamas negotiations ride on the amount of leverage mediators are willing to apply to both sides as fresh talks resume next week. The BR has significant power over Israel, both in the political cover that the BR provides Israel in the UN and in the ability to stop the flow of bombs to Israel. The BR could say that it would have Israel's back if it were attacked by Iran or by Hezbollah, but it would no longer provide bombs for Israel to drop on Gaza. Egypt and Qatar each have significant leverage over Hamas: parts of the Hamas leadership are based in Doha, while the Rafah crossing has acted as a lifeline to the Gaza Strip. There are reported to be 160,000 Palestinians who escaped the horrors of the war in Gaza and who are overstaying their visas in Egypt. This is another point of leverage on Hamas, or on the Palestinian people.

## **O fim da guerra e o caminho para a paz**

At this point, more than 10 months into the war with more than 40,000 people killed in Gaza and more than 1,600 Israelis killed, this war must come to an end. There is no military solution to this conflict and there has never been one. There must be a new path to a negotiated end of the larger conflict, but it begins by ending this war, Israel withdrawing from Gaza, Israeli hostages coming home and the establishment of a secure border between Gaza and Egypt. That would pave the way for the creation of a responsible and legitimate non-Hamas government in Gaza, an Arab-led international force in Gaza for a limited period of time, new elections in Palestine, new elections in Israel and then a regional peace process that will bring about the two-state solution, with an end to the Israeli occupation, a free democratic Palestine, and freedom, peace and security for all.

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## **Partilha de casos**

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## **comentário do comentarista**

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